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The commodity market super-cycle and food price crisis have been associated with 
rampant food insecurity and the Arab spring. A multitude of factors were identified as cul-
prits for excessive volatility on the commodity markets. However, as it regards fertilizers, 
a clear attribution of market drivers explaining the emergence of extreme price events is 
still missing. In this paper, we provide a quantitative assessment of the price spike of the 
global phosphorus fertilizer market in 2008 focusing on diammonium phosphate (DAP). 
We find that fertilizer market policies in India, the largest global importer of phosphorus 
fertilizers and phosphate rock, turned out to be a major contributor to the global price 
spike. India doubled its import of P-fertilizer in 2008 at a time when prices doubled. 
The analysis of a wide set of factors pertinent to the 2008 price spike in phosphorus 
fertilizer market leads us to the discovery of a price spike magnification and triggering 
mechanisms. We find that the price spike was magnified on the one hand by protec-
tive trade measures of fertilizer suppliers leading to a 19% drop in global phosphate 
fertilizer export. On the other hand, the Indian fertilizer subsidy scheme led to farmers 
not adjusting their demand for fertilizer. The triggering mechanism appeared to be the 
Indian production outage of P-fertilizer resulting in the additional import demand for DAP 
in size of about 20% of annual global supply. The main conclusion is that these three 
factors have jointly caused the spike, underscoring the need for ex ante improvements 
in fertilizer market regulation on both national and international levels.
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inTrODUcTiOn
There were multiple economic impacts associated with the global financial crisis of 2007–2008. Market 
distortions were observable in oil and food prices, where oil was demonstrating a gradual increase 
over the 5 years preceding the crisis, whereas food prices, e.g., wheat price remained relatively stable 
and rocketed during the two crisis years showing a 100% increase (1). The scale of the rapid food 
price increase is vividly represented by the real food price index (RFPI1) calculated by the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Over the two crisis years 2007–2008, RFPI 
increased at an average rate of 18% per year, which is the fastest annual growth observed over the 
1 http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsituation/foodpricesindex/en/.
FigUre 1 | Historical price dynamics of phosphate rock, diammonium 
phosphate (DAP), triple superphosphate (TSP), urea, and potassium chloride 
(muriate of potash). Source: World Bank Commodity Price Data (The Pink 
Sheet), annual indices 1960 to present, real 2005 US dollars.
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past 55 years (1961–2015). The rapid growth in 2007–2008 is even 
more pronounced for dairy, cereal, and oil components of the 
RFPI (on average +27, +31, and +33% per year, respectively). An 
analysis of 2008 food crisis (2) points out the need to understand 
the connection between actual price changes and the impacts of 
fertilizer prices, behavioral responses to rising food prices, and 
government policies. In this context, however not directly linking 
to food prices, we analyze fertilizer markets, relevant policies, and 
also provide an approximate estimation of farmers’ response.
As modern agricultural producers rely heavily on fertilizer 
use to supply crops with necessary nutrients and achieve higher 
yields, the prices in food and fertilizer markets are naturally 
strongly correlated. In 2008, there was a price spike on the global 
fertilizer market as summarized by WBFPI—the World Bank’s 
fertilizer price index (3). The average annual WBFPI increase in 
2007–2008 was +77% per year, which is well beyond the price 
jump observed in the food and oil markets, with a 2008 WBFPI 
spike of +120% from the 2007 price level. The 2008 real price 
increase as illustrated in Figure  1 was particularly strong in 
potassium and phosphorus fertilizers, when potassium chloride 
added +164% and phosphorus fertilizers diammonium phos-
phate (DAP) and triple superphosphate (TSP) added +108 and 
+140% to their 2007 levels, respectively (4). The most notable 
price spike far beyond those observed in food, oil, and ready-
made fertilizer markets was in phosphate rock (PR), which is the 
main raw material for the production of phosphorus fertilizer: PR 
price added +352% to the 2007 level.
The global PR market is highly concentrated: according to 
2008 and 2015 USGS reports, more than 90% of the total produced 
quantity is mined by a handful of countries (5, 6). The global 
reserves of scarce PR resources are also highly concentrated with 
about 75% of the world reserves concentrated in Morocco and 
Western Sahara, followed by 5% in China and 3% in Algeria (6). 
The biggest PR supplier on the world market according to the 
average annual data for 2005–2009 is Morocco with 11.7 Mtons/
year followed by Jordan with 3.7 Mtons/year (1). Here and fur-
ther, we abbreviate million tons with megatons. The biggest PR 
consumer on the world market according to the average annual 
data for 2005–2009 is by far India with 4.9 Mtons/year followed 
by USA with 1.7  Mtons/year (1). In the ready-made fertilizer 
trade (including DAP, TSP, and monoammonium phosphate—
MAP), the share of DAP exceeds 50% when accounting for P as 
a nutrient (7). In the years preceding and following 2008, the 
biggest seller and buyer of DAP on the international market 
were, respectively, the USA and India both with about 5 Mtons 
of DAP traded annually (1).
In the context of the 2008 phosphorus fertilizer price spike, 
the aim of this research is to identify major factors that triggered 
the price peak and those that pushed the price higher up. The 
essential motivating questions are why India doubled imports 
of P-fertilizer (DAP) in 2008 when the price had doubled and if 
this increase of DAP importation by India could have caused or 
substantially contributed to the price spike.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
The following analysis, framed within the agricultural develop-
ment trends in India preceding 2008, provides a review of poten-
tial global market price drivers with added quantitative analytics 
and concludes with the exploration of Indian policies in domestic 
agriculture and fertilizer industry.
Trends in indian agriculture
India’s agricultural production is demonstrating a constant 
increasing trend since mid-1990s (8). According to FAO data, 
the harvested area for cereals remains nearly constant with the 
exception of soybeans and maize that is still marginal in relative 
terms (8). As illustrated in Figure 2, crop yields grew, supported 
by substantial intensification through a higher usage of fertilizer 
(8). The increase in efficiency of agricultural production allowed 
India to reduce import of cereals and become one of the major 
world exporters: the net export of cereals increased from almost 
0 in the late 1990s to 10–20 Mtons in 2011–2012 (8).
According to FAOSTAT (8), the total value of fertilizers 
imported by India increased from 0.6 bln US$ in 2002 to 4.9 bln 
US$ in 2007 and 13.3 bln in 2008; the net export value of agricul-
tural goods increased from 1.5 bln US$ in 2002 to 8.6 bln US$ in 
2007 and 8.2 bln US$ in 2008; and domestic food consumption 
(calories per capita) increased in the period 2002–2008. Until 
2007, intensification through greater fertilizer use was paying 
off and from this perspective the Indian strategic commitment 
to agricultural intensification for meeting domestic demand and 
increasing export revenues seemed to be well founded. However, 
in 2008, the cost of fertilizer imports exceeded the agricultural 
export value.
global Fertilizer Price Drivers
As there is a considerable economic impact of the 2008 fertilizer 
price peak on the economics of Indian agricultural sector, this 
section provides a reflection on the global market price driv-
ers relevant to the observed price peak and widely quoted in 
FigUre 2 | India’s cereals production (top left panel), harvested areas (top right panel), crop yields (bottom left panel), and fertilizer use (bottom right panel). Source: 
FAOSTAT.
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the literature (9–13). These drivers are assumed to have jointly 
produced the observed effect; however, as we highlight below, 
the relative contribution of individual drivers is likely to be very 
different.
The falling trend of the value of the US dollar was observed over 
the period 2003–2008, when the US dollar depreciated against the 
Brazilian real (48%), Canadian dollar (34%), the Russian ruble 
(23%), the Indian rupee (18%), and the Chinese yuan (13%). 
This is assumed to have led to a rising demand in some of these 
countries as the imports became cheaper. According to our analy-
sis, the influence of this factor on the explored fertilizer price is 
rather moderate for a number of reasons. First, the exchange rate 
influence is not sector specific at a global scale. Second, fertilizer 
imports for agricultural products to be consumed domestically 
could have indeed become cheaper, whereas this is less true 
regarding exports traded against the US$. Third, the moderate 
shift in exchange rate is unlikely to have produced a price spike 
in fertilizers of the observed magnitude.
A spike in transportation costs due to the increase in fuel 
prices and high demand for freight services during 2007–2008 
is considered as another contributor to the 2008 fertilizer price 
spike. According to our assessment, similar to the exchange rate, 
this influence is rather moderate. Using US RMOC Freight Rate 
Index as a proxy (14), one could conclude that the freight cost 
at peak in 2008 had a relatively small increase of 25% compared 
to 2007. Another valuation of the transport cost increase and 
potential impact this caused could be made employing the data 
from the UN Comtrade database (1). The analysis of the global 
annual traded quantity in PR and the respective reported trade 
values of the export and import leads to an estimation of average 
transportation costs of about 25 US$/ton of PR in 2005–2007, 
whereas in 2008, the estimated transportation cost indeed dou-
bled and exceeded 50 US$/ton. However, the average PR import 
price increased, respectively, from 70 to 80 US$/ton to almost 220 
US$/ton in 2008, meaning that the share of the transport cost in 
the import price dropped from almost 40% to below 25%. This 
consideration makes it clear that even though transport costs have 
contributed to the price increase, this was rather a marginal factor.
An increase in oil prices is deemed to have contributed to the 
fertilizer price spike. According to our analysis, in relation to 
phosphorus fertilizer and the 2008 price peak, this was rather 
marginal contribution. The observed response of fertilizer prices 
to oil prices (3) is rather disproportionate: the relative increase 
in oil prices in 2008 compared to 2007 was about +35%, whereas 
the increase in fertilizer prices over the same period was about 
+135% as illustrated in Figure 3.
FigUre 3 | Global fertilizer and oil prices in percent relative to 2007. Data 
from database: Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities,  
World Bank.
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Increasing raw material costs in 2007–2008, e.g., PR prices 
almost tripled are named among the other factors contributing 
to fertilizer price increase. Regarding specifically the phosphorus 
fertilizers, the principal raw material PR is almost fully consumed 
by the fertilizer industry and ultimately lands on the fertilizer 
market, this is why the extreme PR price increase cannot be 
considered as an external factor to the industry where PR mining 
is effectively part of it.
Even though an increasing concentration of market power in 
a few major countries and companies is certain, this fact alone 
is not likely to have triggered the 2008 price peak. However, it 
could have magnified the peak. China, as one of the largest phos-
phate exporters in the world in the years 2005–2006 preceding 
the crisis, supplied about 5% of PR and about 7% of DAP to the 
global international market and in 2007 China even increased 
its DAP share to 19% while decreasing its PR share down to 3% 
according to the UN Comtrade database (1). In April 2008, China 
introduced an export tax of 100% on fertilizers to ensure that 
domestic production was used within China (10). This led to a 
correction of the Chinese share in DAP on international market 
down to 8% (still higher than in 2006), yet slightly increased its 
PR share from 3 to 7% as reported in Comtrade (1). Overall, out of 
the 19% drop in global phosphate fertilizer export in 2008 (P2O5 
equivalent), only 7% can be attributed to China according to a 
report based on the data from International Fertilizer Industry 
Association (IFA) (16). This is a clear indication that it is not only 
China who had decreased exports in favor of protecting domestic 
consumption. At this point of the analysis, the protective reaction 
of fertilizer supplying countries seems to be a plausible price spike 
magnifying mechanism: in anticipation of a high export price, 
national authorities protect domestic consumption by reducing 
the export, hence tightening the supply, and in so doing, increase 
international prices even more.
Another factor mentioned in the literature is that major inter-
national buyers subsidize domestic use of fertilizers, and this is the 
reason for farmers being slow in reducing consumption in response 
to a price increase. This component of the price spike magnifying 
mechanism is discussed below together with its plausible trigger.
Fertilizer Policies in india and  
Their implications
As we discussed above, over the past years, India has increased 
agricultural production through intensification, where fertilizer 
application plays an important role. Agricultural production is 
important for meeting the demand of domestic consumption and 
is a substantial part of Indian export. The total share of agriculture 
in Indian GDP is about 18% according to the World Bank data 
(17). This share is relatively large compared to other countries: in 
China, the respective share is below 10%, in Russia below 6%, and 
below 2% in the USA and Austria (17). To support agriculture 
as a major sector in Indian economy, the government provides 
domestic farmers with fertilizer subsidies.
There have been several fertilizer subsidy schemes imple-
mented in India over past decades, and they vary both by the 
fertilizer type and price setting mechanism. An exhaustive 
authoritative overview is provided by the Department of 
An increase in fertilizer demand for biofuels production 
in the US, Brazil, and Europe is often mentioned among the 
factors contributing to the price spike in 2008. Even though 
from 2007 to 2008 there was a large +33% increase (+10 mln 
ha) in the area under energy crops (15), the total 2008 global 
production increase in biofuels was only about +5%, adding 
50–1,150 Mtons in oil equivalent (15). On global scale, there 
was no visible expansion of the agricultural area that remained 
constant at about 5,000 million ha over the entire 2000–2008 
period according to FAOSTAT (8). Hence, one cannot expect 
an extreme change of fertilizer consumption in 2008 explained 
by biofuels.
Agricultural commodity prices almost doubled in the 2 years 
2007 and 2008, leading to increasing profits of farmers and hence 
are assumed to have stimulated higher demand. We find that 
food price increase alone seems to be a rather moderate factor 
in terms of scale of the impact on fertilizer price. This argument 
is supported by two facts. First, farmers in many food exporting 
countries enjoyed high price levels for their production, yet only 
India experienced a dramatic increase in the quantity of imported 
fertilizer. Second, the food price peak is less pronounced than that 
of fertilizer, adding about 18% in price annually in 2007–2008 as 
described by FAO’s RFPI.
Low inventories at the beginning of 2008 and the limited 
capacity of the fertilizer industry to rapidly adjust to a surging 
demand are claimed to have greatly influenced the market. As 
it regards inventories, there is unfortunately no information on 
global scale and an attempt to produce an estimate based on the 
FAOSTAT data (8) for India for 2002–2013 by taking into account 
production, consumption, and trade quantities expressed in P2O5 
total nutrients and assuming 0 balance in 2002 uncovered an 
inconsistency in data leading to an accumulated balance deficit 
of 6 Mtons of P2O5 equivalent over the time period of 2002–2013. 
This P-imbalance is equal to the average annual consumption 
of India over the time period of 2002–2013. The fact that the 
fertilizer industry did not cope with increased demand is either 
an indicator of bad planning of supply, some unforeseen extreme 
changes in demand or/and desire to increase profits by exercising 
the market power. All these aspects may have played a role, as we 
discuss below.
FigUre 4 | Production of fertilizers in India according to FAOSTAT (left panel) and specifically diammonium phosphate production in India according to the 
Department of Fertilizers of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers of India (right panel).
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Fertilizers of the Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers of India 
(18). Here, we highlight some of the information relevant spe-
cifically to P-fertilizers. First, according to the Comtrade data 
(1), PR and DAP are the major sources of P in Indian import, 
whereas MAP accounts for about 10% of volume and value of 
DAP. The DAP-related policy in force in 2002–2010 was essen-
tially a price cap provided to a farmer by the government in the 
form of guaranteed maximum retail prices (MRPs). According 
to the subsidy scheme, “the difference in the delivered price of 
fertilizers at the farm gate and the MRP was compensated by the 
Government as subsidy to the manufacturers/importers” (18). 
This scheme is effectively fixing the price for domestic farmers 
and isolating them from any negative impact of increasing prices 
on international fertilizer markets. Moreover, if the food prices 
start to increase, the farmers have an incentive for buying extra 
amount of fertilizer in order to obtain higher yields (or expand 
area) and export products in larger quantities, maximizing 
their revenues at a minor cost. A moderate increase in food 
prices could be a sufficient incentive to increase fertilizer use 
under these conditions, leading to a demand increase where the 
fertilizer purchasing price is virtually unlimited. This forms the 
consumer side of the fertilizer spike magnifying mechanism, 
exacerbating effects of fertilizer export restrictions on the pro-
ducer’s side.
Indian agricultural producers in 2008 seem to have been in a 
very favorable situation. Below we analyze the Indian domestic 
fertilizer producers’ environment. According to the FAOSTAT 
data, throughout the entire 2005–2008 period, Indian fertilizer 
production was in decline with the largest decline (about 50% 
over that entire period) in phosphorus fertilizer (Figure 4). The 
data provided by the Department of Fertilizers of the Ministry of 
Chemicals and Fertilizers of India demonstrate an even sharper 
drop in domestic DAP production in 2008 as compared to 2007: 
the relative change to the previous year was about −13% in 2007 
and −29% in 2008 (Figure 4).
An analysis of the import, production, and consumption can 
help better illuminate farmer behavior in the year of the price 
peak. Taking into account that the import of P-fertilizer was 
at a stable level over 2005–2007 as illustrated by Figure  5, the 
production gap in 2007–2008 (Figure 4) led to the accumulated 
deficit in domestic DAP production of 2.5 Mtons (using 2006 level 
as the baseline). The increase of DAP import over the period of 
2007–2008 was 1.8 Mtons, estimated with the data from Comtrade 
(1). Hence, over 2007–2008, Indian farmers experienced a deficit 
in DAP of about 2.5 − 1.8 = 0.7 Mtons (unless it was compensated 
by reserves).
Based on FAOSTAT data (8) on Indian import, this estimate 
is different: the total reported import increase in P2O5 equivalent 
over 2007–2008 (using 2006 as a baseline) was 1.7  Mtons. As 
the PR import stayed within this time frame at a constant level 
(see Figure 6), this increase can be attributed to a ready-made fer-
tilizer (DAP, MAP, complex fertilizer) import increase, so that the 
amount of fertilizer in DAP equivalent would be approximately 
+3.4 Mtons employing IFA’s (7) conversion factor of about 50% 
content of P2O5 in DAP/MAP. As the Indian-imported MAP 
quantity is about 10% of that of DAP, the increase of DAP quantity 
imported over 2007–2008 using FAOSTAT leads to an estimate 
of 3.1 Mtons. This figure is able to compensate the reported by 
India 2.5 Mtons drop in DAP production and even indicates a 
0.6-Mtons surplus in DAP. In fact, this number is likely smaller 
as we have accounted for complex fertilizers within this DAP 
equivalent. So, the estimated range is −0.7 … +0.6 Mtons of DAP 
for farmer use over the period 2007–2008. The up to +0.6 Mtons 
overall usage increase possibly caused by a higher demand from 
farmers is comparatively small as it is only 20% of the import 
increase (0.6/3.1 Mtons) as compared to the rest 80% caused by 
the deficit in domestic DAP production (2.5 Mtons) using 2006 
level as a baseline. The farmers’ increase in P-fertilizer use in 2008 
as reported by FAOSTAT (8) and illustrated in Figure 2 is even 
less—only about 10%.
The highlighted differences between FAOSTAT and Comtrade 
serve the purposes of estimating the farmers’ behavior. Employing 
Comtrade data that provides a lower estimate of Indian DAP 
import increase as compared to FAOSTAT does not lead to differ-
ent conclusion on the role of India as compared to China. To sup-
port this statement, we use Comtrade data on DAP and in what 
Table 1 | Aggregated traded diammonium phosphate quantities for India 
and China over the period 2006–2008 as reported in the UN Comtrade 
database (1).
Year china (export, Mtons) india (import, Mtons)
2006 0.79 3.03
2007 1.97 2.59
2008 0.82 5.23
FigUre 6 | Indian import of phosphate rock (PR) and diammonium 
phosphate (DAP). Source: Comtrade.
FigUre 5 | Indian import of fertilizers N, P, and K (total nutrients). Source: FAOSTAT.
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follows we use the plus sign “+” to indicate increased availability 
on the market and minus sign “−” to indicate decreased avail-
ability on the market caused by a trade partner. First, referring 
to Table 1, the change in traded quantities are China +1.2 Mtons 
and India −1.8 Mtons accumulated over 2007–2008 using 2006 
as a baseline,2 meaning that aggregated over 2  years, China 
was rather lowering the price by supplying additional quantity. 
Second, respective numbers in the year 2008 using 2007 as a 
baseline are China −1.2 Mtons and India −2.6 Mtons, meaning 
that the Indian impact in terms of quantity is more than two times 
bigger than that of China. Third, the protective measures China 
took in 2008 were a response to the already increasing fertilizer 
2 The calculation for China of a 2-year accumulated excess of supply using 2006 as a 
baseline is: 1.97 + 0.82 − 2 × 0.79 = 1.21 Mtons. The calculation for India is similar.
prices (10) rather than triggering them. The aggregates above 
are based on the original numbers that countries reported as 
exported (China) and imported (India) summarized in Table 1. 
A cross check for each DAP trade reported in Comtrade between 
any two countries and respective correction for possible omis-
sions by taking the maximum of the two reported quantities (one 
for importer and one for exporter) would make the estimates 
even more pronounced: China +1.5 Mtons and India −2.2 Mtons 
over 2007–2008 (2006 as a baseline) and China −1.0 Mtons and 
India −3.1 Mtons in the year 2008 (2007 as a baseline). Taking 
into account the fact that over 2006–2008, China was also 
importing DAP, and overall reduced its import and increased 
export, Chinese numbers can be further adjusted and expressed 
in terms of net export impact: +3.7 Mtons over 2007–2008 (2006 
as a baseline) and only −0.6 Mtons in the year 2008 (2007 as a 
baseline). These possible adjustments of the original numbers 
reported in Comtrade emphasize the major role of India in terms 
of demanded DAP quantity on the international market in 2008.
resUlTs
Out of wide set of factors quoted in the literature and quantitatively 
analyzed in this paper, the most decisive factor in the Indian DAP 
import increase as supported by the official statistical data was 
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domestic production drop in 2007–2008. This led to an increase 
in demand in the world market by about 2.6–3.1 Mtons of DAP 
(affecting also MAP and complex fertilizers) in 2008 as compared 
to the previous year, while China increased DAP supply over 
2007–2008 and took protective measures in 2008 reducing its 
export by 0.6–1.2 Mtons as compared to the previous year. Two 
consecutive drops in 2007 and 2008 in Indian domestic phos-
phate fertilizer production of, respectively, −0.5 and −2.0 Mtons 
of DAP (as compared to 2006 production level), which is about 
5 and 20% of global DAP market, respectively, had likely trig-
gered the P-fertilizer price spike of 2008 affecting other fertilizers, 
or at least had a decisive impact on the price spike magnitude. 
Protective measures of DAP exporters lead to a tighter supply 
and magnified the price spike. The potential response of Indian 
farmers to growing prices was buffered out by a price-agnostic 
subsidy scheme that also magnified the peak.
The reason for the Indian production drop was highly unfa-
vorable conditions created for domestic producers as was later 
reported by the Department of Fertilizers: “The fertilizer sector 
worked in a highly regulated environment with cost of production 
and selling prices being determined by the Government of India. 
The growth of fertilizer industry was stagnated with virtually no 
investments … for over eight years in P&K sector” (18). The lack 
of a subsidy scheme supporting fertilizer produces symmetric to 
the one targeting fertilizer consumers resulted in the production 
drops in 2007–2008. So, the agricultural subsidies targeting farm-
ers failed on another end—in the fertilizer production, as these 
supportive measures were isolated from the domestic fertilizer 
industry.
DiscUssiOn
The failure in domestic policy resulted in a substantial impact 
outside of India in international fertilizer markets. A doubling 
of DAP demand within 1  year by the largest world importer, 
virtually without limits on the purchasing price, is very likely 
to have led to the observed market distortion. Moreover, as the 
fertilizer subsidy also covered product delivery, it is likely that 
the export price push was accompanied by a similar push to 
transportation prices, potentially affecting also the transporta-
tion market.
Interestingly, Indian farmers have not created an exceptionally 
strong additional demand being provided with a price guarantee 
and facing food price increase on the international market—they 
have increased consumption in 2008 by about only 10%, which 
is comparable to some previous and later years when the subsidy 
scheme changed.
Demand coming from the farmers’ side seems to be quite 
inelastic. The consequences of this inelasticity for the price 
dynamics in 2008 were amplified through national protective 
measures (China introducing export tariffs), tightening supply, 
and leading to higher prices. However, the respective impact is 
of secondary magnitude compared to the demand increase in the 
international market.
According to the Department of Fertilizers (19), “indigenous 
rock phosphate supplies meet only 5–10% of the total requirement 
of P2O5” in India, so the country is highly dependent on import 
of this raw material. According to Comtrade (1), India demon-
strated a stable PR import at an approximately constant level 
through 2005–2008. At the same time, according to Comtrade 
(1), Morocco reported decrease its export in 2008 by −39% of 
DAP to the previous year (−4% of global supply) and −18% of PR 
(−9% of global supply). The situation is not completely clear as the 
respective counterparts report only −4% decrease of the import 
from Morocco. Since some importers might not have reported 
their trade for political reasons connected with the Western 
Sahara territory, and as PR production (mining) in Morocco was 
stable according to USGS, this probable drop in PR export may 
have supported the P price increase. In this context, a deeper 
analysis of the global PR supply dynamics might be worthwhile.
Another obvious fact to note is that the ultimate beneficiar-
ies of the observed market distortion in 2008 were the fertilizer 
producers who collected outstanding profits in 2008. Taking 
into account high concentration of mining and production and 
common interest in profit maximization of a handful of big com-
panies, one cannot exclude the possibility of their cooperation 
in supporting growing prices even without explicit coordination. 
Mosaic’s operating margin increased in 2007–2008 from 10% 
to almost 30% (13). According to Potash Corp. (20), their gross 
margin almost tripled in 2008 as compared to a quite successful 
year 2007. As fertilizers are important inputs in modern agricul-
ture and ultimately impact food security, the consequences of a 
fertilizer market distortion might have potentially heavy impacts, 
especially when such a distortion duration lasts over several 
years. Therefore, there is a strong need for coordinated policies 
on national and international levels to provide stable conditions 
for all parties.
A note of caution on the conclusions obtained in this analyti-
cal work is that even though these are based on the data from the 
official and openly available sources such as FAOSTAT (8) and 
the UN Comtrade (1), these sources are known to be inaccurate 
and the data contained therein may be inconsistent as illustrated 
above for the Indian P-stock balance estimation. These conclu-
sions would be subject to change if there were a major revision of 
the numbers provided by these sources.
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